Double or Nothing: Multiplicative Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Double or Nothing: Multiplicative Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing
Paper summary The paper proposes a payment rule for crowdsourced tasks. This rule is intended to incentivize workers to accurately report their confidence (e.g. by skipping a task when they have low confidence), and to pay little to spammers. Payment is based on the product of the evaluations of a worker's responses to a set of gold-standard tasks; if the worker gets a single gold standard task wrong and asserts high confidence, the overall payment is zero.
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Double or Nothing: Multiplicative Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing
Shah, Nihar Bhadresh and Zhou, Denny
Neural Information Processing Systems Conference - 2015 via Bibsonomy
Keywords: dblp


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